Job design, job assignment and career concerns

• Номер работы:
  681542
• Раздел:
  Все работы   →   Рефераты и реферативные задания   →   Экономика предприятия
• Год добавления:
  20.05.2021 г.
• Объем работы:
  31 стр.
• Содержание:
  Introduction……………………………………………………………………...3
  1.Approach of Michael Waldman to job assignment…………………………...4
  2.Theory and evidence in internal labor markets………………………………..11
  3.Links to further contributions on the same topic…………………………….26
  Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..28
  References……………………………………………………………………...31
  
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  Некоторые тезисы из работы по теме Job design, job assignment and career concerns
  1.Approach of Michael Waldman to job assignment
  In his works, Waldman offers an interesting and efficient model of employment. When one firm tries to hire an employee from another firm, the hiring firm is usually at an informational disadvantage in terms of the employee"s ability level. To overcome this problem, we argue that such firms will try to use a person"s job assignment as an inaccurate signal about their abilities. Thus, the information asymmetry between current employers and potential employers is somewhat weakened by the idea that job appointments are often publicly available and that potential employers can therefore use job assignments as signals of ability level.
  The assumption that firms are restricted to spot contracts means that a firm cannot write contracts in one period that commit the firm to specific actions or policies in a subsequent period. For example, in offering a young worker a contract, a firm cannot bind itself to specific wage policies for the period when the worker is old. The method of analysis is to treat the problem as an extensive-form game with imperfect information, where the specific game corresponding to the wage- setting process for any particular old worker is as follows.
  At the end of the first period, the employer who previously assigned the worker to job 1 observes the worker"s ability level, and subsequently offers the worker a job assignment-wage rate pair for the second period. The market (the other firms in the economy) then observes this job assignment-wage rate offer, and subsequently makes the worker a competing wage offer. Finally, we assume that the worker accepts the highest wage offer he receives, and that, given equal wage offers, the worker remains with his first-period employer.
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